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Abstract 
While it is widely acknowledged that internal R&D is a fundamental source of the ability to absorb, select and 
use external knowledge, severe data limitations prevent from capturing differences across firms in this respect. 
Using a novel dataset supplied by the Italian Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT), we highlight that, when controlling for 
internal R&D efforts, not all firms are equally prone to gain access to external technology, and to the knowledge 
provided by universities in particular. We find that firms which do not only perform R&D activities but also 
belong to a group exhibit a higher propensity to access to external knowledge by either contracting out R&D or 
cooperating with external parties, as compared to independent firms that are not organized into groups. This 
premium persists when controlling for different measures of internal R&D efforts. Furthermore, the differential 
in the propensity to access external knowledge is particularly high in the case of R&D performers belonging to 
foreign groups, i.e. Italian affiliates of foreign owned companies; and it is even higher in the case of the few 
Italian firms that have R&D activities abroad. The relative dis-advantage of independent firms, which represent 
the bulk of the Italian industry and include most small and medium sized enterprises, appears to be less of an 
obstacle in the case of linkages with universities, especially when R&D contracting out is considered. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that internal R&D is a 
fundamental source of the ability to absorb, select and 
use external knowledge. This idea plays a central role 
in analyses of innovation generation and diffusion and 
has been subsumed in industrial organization 
approaches in general2. Empirical research has 
generally recognized that firms significantly differ in 
their access to external knowledge due to their level of 
“absorptive capacity”, which in turn is most often 
identified in terms of some measure of internal R&D 
efforts (Veugelers 1997, Piga and Vivarelli 2004, 
Cassiman and Veugelers 2006, Belderbos et al 2004, 
2014, Spithoven and Teirlinck 2014). Nevertheless, due 
to severe data limitations, scholars are frequently 
unable to either satisfactorily measure such R&D 
efforts, or capture other characteristics of firms that 
may influence their ability and propensity to gain 
access to complementary knowledge sources.  
 
Using a novel dataset supplied by the Italian Bureau 
of Statistics (ISTAT), we are able to distinguish 
different measures of R&D efforts that provide a better 
understanding of “internal” absorptive capacity in the 
case of firms active in Italy. Moreover, we are enabled 
to identify different categories of firms that exhibit 
distinct propensities to access external knowledge, even 
controlling for these (improved) measures of internal 
R&D efforts and other standard controls, such as size, 
industry and time dummies. The categories we identify 
can be associated to other abilities to absorb and utilize 
external knowledge that are harder to measure. In 
particular we focus on group belonging as a further 
indicator of the capacity to absorb, utilize and extract 
economic value from external knowledge. We find that 
firms which do not only perform R&D activities but 
also belong to a group exhibit a higher propensity to 
access to external knowledge by either contracting out 
R&D or cooperating with external parties, as compared 
to independent firms that are not organized into groups. 
This premium persists when controlling for different 
measures of internal R&D efforts. Furthermore, the 
differential in the propensity to access external 
knowledge is particularly high in the case of R&D 
                                                
2 Economics of innovation has long emphasized the 
links between internal and external knowledge that 
reflect the systemic nature of technical change 
(Mowery and Rosenberg 1989, Cohen and Levinthal 
1989, 1990). IO models have traditionally emphasized 
a dual role of spillovers: outgoing spillovers may 
reduce the incentives of firms to enter cooperative 
agreements while incoming spillovers increase the 
attractiveness of cooperation (De Bondt and Veugelers, 
1991; Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1995; Eaton and 
Eswaran, 1997). More recent IO models take into 
account that firms can attempt to manage spillovers, 
trying to minimize outgoing spillovers while at the 
same time maximizing incoming spillovers (Cassiman 
et al., 2002; Martin, 2002; Amir et al., 2003). Firms can 
increase the effectiveness of incoming spillovers by 
investing in “absorptive capacity”. 
performers belonging to foreign groups, i.e. Italian 
affiliates of foreign owned companies; and it is even 
higher in the case of the few Italian firms that have 
R&D activities abroad. The latter is a very narrow but 
important subset of Italian firms belonging to a group, 
which have significantly increased their R&D efforts 
over the past decade.  
 
The premia observed in the case of firms belonging 
to groups have to do with the technological and 
organizational advantages that are generally associated 
to this form of corporate governance. The correlation 
between group belonging, technical efficiency and 
innovative behavior has been analyzed for several 
countries3. As documented in a number of studies, the 
development of business groups has traditionally 
characterised the top layer of Italian capitalism (Barca 
and Trento, 1997; Colajanni, 1991), but also involves a 
wide variety of firm categories, including medium sized 
enterprises. In fact, the so-called “Italian Mittelstand” 
can compensate for the lack of economies of scales and 
scope by joining both horizontal and vertical groups, 
and exploit the flexibility of this governance structure 
to adapt to changing market and technological 
conditions (Colli and Vasta, 2010), enhance R&D 
investments (Cozza and Zanfei 2014) and foster 
technical efficiency (Zeli 2002). This should inter alia 
increase the ability of firms belonging to groups to 
access and utilize external knowledge.   
 
Firms taking part in international groups may have 
even greater technological and organizational 
advantages than those belonging to national groups 
(Cantwell 1989, Doms and Jensen 1998, Zanfei 2000, 
Ietto-Gillies 2001, Narula and Zanfei 2005, Guadalupe 
et al 2012). On the one hand, multinational groups rely 
on extensive intra-group networks of affiliates that span 
across different markets and different national 
innovation systems. This allows units of a multinational 
group to benefit from the valuable knowledge that is 
either generated within the internal network of 
affiliates, though their own R&D facilities and plant 
level engineering, or accessed via the external network 
of technical alliances that each affiliate is able to set up 
with third parties (Zanfei 2000, Castellani and Zanfei 
2006). Knowledge accumulated via internal and 
external networks of a multinational group is generally 
available to the parent company and eventually to each 
subsidiary at a lower cost than through arms-length 
transactions (Griffith et al 2006, Rabbiosi and 
Santagelo 2013), and can usefully complement the 
absorptive capacity available at the level of each 
individual firm. We can identify this as “intra-group 
absorptive capacity”, which can be expected to be 
substantially higher in the case of multinational groups 
than in the case of national groups, let alone the case of 
                                                
3 This is particularly the case of studies on the 
correlation between group belonging and economic 
performance in newly industrializing countries. See 
Hobday (1995) for East Asian countries, and Mahmood 
and Mitchell (2004) for Korea and Taiwan in particular. 
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independent firms. Such additional absorptive capacity 
should thus further increase the ability of firms 
belonging to multinational groups – i.e. foreign owned 
companies and national firms with (R&D) activities 
abroad – to evaluate and access external knowledge.   
 
On the other hand, firms belonging to multinational 
groups have additional advantages that derive from the 
possibility of applying - and extracting economic value 
from the application of - the available knowledge to an 
extensive number and variety of national and local 
contexts, where the multinational is located and active 
(Dunning 1981, Caves 1996). This advantage applies to 
all knowledge available, whichever may be the channel 
though which it is generated or assimilated, hence 
including the knowledge accessed from external 
sources. Thus, the ubiquitous nature of multinationals 
makes it significantly more advantageous for its units 
to search for, and gain access to, external sources of 
knowledge.  
 
Therefore, multinational companies combine what 
we have called “intra-group absorptive capacity”, 
which increases the ability to gain access to external 
knowledge, with the advantages of extracting greater 
rents from its application. This combination of 
characteristics helps explain the extra propensity of 
firms belonging to multinational groups to set up 
technical linkages with third parties.  
 
From this perspective, we shall explore the links 
between group belonging, absorptive capacity and 
access to external knowledge using an extremely 
detailed database on R&D activities of 13,675 firms 
active in Italy over 2000-2010. The remainder of this 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
description of data used in this paper and illustrates the 
patterns of internal and external R&D activities of firms 
active in Italy. In section 3 we produce estimates of the 
propensity of different categories of Italian firms to 
resort to external knowledge sourcing. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Data description 
This paper exploits a novel dataset based on the 
Italian R&D survey (RS1) conducted by ISTAT (the 
Italian Bureau of Statistics) and targeted at all potential 
R&D performers. The survey follows a census 
approach and is structured according to the OECD 
Frascati Manual (2002) guidelines. Respondents to the 
RS1 questionnaire provide ISTAT with detailed data on 
internal R&D efforts. The ones used in this paper refer 
to the amount of intra-muros R&D expenditures, their 
persistence over time and the number of R&D 
employees. We will also use data deriving from 
respondents’ answers to specific questions on external 
linkages of these R&D performers: extra-muros R&D 
expenditures and technical cooperation, which are both 
broken down by type of partners (including other firms, 
private and public research institutions, and 
Universities). Finally, the RS1 database provides 
complementary information on firm size (in terms of 
total employees), capital expenditure, main (NACE five 
digit) sector of activity, and indicates whether the 
responding firm belongs to a national or foreign group. 
 
Based on the ISTAT RS1 survey over the 2001-2010 
we built an unbalanced panel of R&D performers active 
in Italy, with 39,152 observations, corresponding to a 
total of 13,675 firms performing R&D at least in one 
year.  
Breaking this sample down by typology of firm, in 
figure 1 we can notice that a large majority (more than 
60% of total respondents) is represented by R&D 
performers that do not belong to a group (Italian firms 
Not in a Group, ING). About one third of the sample is 
composed by Italian firms belonging to Groups (IGP), 
while a minor and decreasing share is represented by 
subsidiaries of Foreign Owned Groups (FOR), that has 
been shrinking from about 10% in 2001 to slightly 
more than 5% of all the firms recorded in the dataset at 
the end of the period.  
As shown in table 1, FOR are about 20% larger (in 
terms of employees) than IGP, and approximately 7 
times as large as ING. A similar ranking can be 
observed when R&D expenditure per firm is 
considered, with FOR spending 40% more than IGP 
and 9 times as much as ING.  
The hierarchy persists if unit R&D efforts are 
calculated in terms of R&D expenditure per R&D 
employees.  One should note, however, that data on 
R&D employees are subject to important limitations 
especially in the case of SMEs, which are a dominant 
component of ING. In fact it is quite common that 
workers are multi-task in small sized firms, and R&D 
activities might well be only one of the multiple roles 
played by them according to needs and circumstances. 
Hence using head counts might lead to substantial 
errors in the measurement of the actual availability of 
R&D workforce4.  A better, albeit not fully satisfactory, 
solution of this problem, would be making use of full 
time equivalent (FTE) employment data, which allow 
to more accurately account for the use of part-time 
R&D contracts, and for spare time R&D efforts 
produced by workers that are mainly involved in other 
activities. We shall deal with these data constraints 
when using multivariate techniques to test the links 
between internal R&D effort and external knowledge 
sourcing. Suffice here to note that differences across 
firm typologies are much lower when R&D personnel 
is measured in terms of FTE rather than head counts, as 
shown in Table 1.  
  
                                                
4 Whether this should lead to overestimate, rather than 
underestimate, the actual R&D efforts, is an empirical 
question. On the one hand, firms might be induced to 
register multi-task workers according to their prevailing 
activities, a practice that is most likely to produce a 
downward bias in the measurement of working time 
devoted to R&D. On the other hand, head-counts would 
lead to an overestimation of R&D efforts in the case of 
firms making an extensive use of  part-time contracts.  
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Figure 1 – Distribution of R&D performers, by typology of firm 
 
 
Source: elaborations on ISTAT RS1 
 
Table 1 – Description of main RS1 variables, by typology of firm 
 
  
ING IGP FOR 
Number of total R&D performers Year 2010 3,775 1,742 393 
Growth rate 250.6% 218.5% 140.8% 
Average size of firms (number of employees 
FTE) 
Year 2010 88.33 499.33 619.08 
Growth rate -1.6% -4.2% -3.6% 
Average Intra-muros R&D expenditure per 
firm (thousand of euros) 
Year 2010 574.97 3,672.44 5,117.95 
Growth rate 1.3% -2.1% -5.4% 
R&D / R&D employees Year 2010 41.79 77.87 104.42 
Growth rate -1.4% -1.4% -0.6% 
R&D / R&D employees FTE Year 2010 125.70 144.57 155.28 
Growth rate 7.1% 3.9% 2.9% 
Average Extra-muros R&D expenditure per 
firm (thousand of euros) 
Year 2010 125.56 752.93 518.45 
Growth rate 22.8% 10.0% -12.2% 
Share of firms cooperating, on total firms Year 2010 29.7% 39.8% 42.2% 
Growth rate 9.7% 6.8% 1,4% 
Share of firms cooperating with university, on 
total firms 
Year 2010 12.9% 19.1% 16.0% 
Growth rate 11.2% 6.1% -1.5% 
Source: elaborations on ISTAT RS1 
Note: the growth rate is calculated as 2001-2010 CAGR 
 
Looking at growth rates, one can observe that, while 
the number of all types of R&D performers has been 
significantly augmenting over 2001-2010, this increase 
has been much higher in the case of IGP, and even 
more so in the case of ING, than in the case of FOR. 
Moreover, firms of all categories have on average 
reduced their size over the same period, and the 
decrease has been higher in the case of FOR and IGP 
than in the case of ING (which were relatively small 
already at the beginning of the period). Firms belonging 
to FOR and IGP categories have also experienced 
decreases in R&D per firm, while ING have instead 
improved their performance in terms of this indicator. 
The scenario changes a bit when R&D efforts are 
measured in terms of FTE R&D personnel: all firm 
categories have increased their R&D per FTE 
employees, but the growth rate of ING firms is one and 
a half times the rate observed for IGT companies, and 
more than twice the rate of FOR firms.  
To summarize, group belonging is associated with 
higher R&D intensity. Both R&D per firm and R&D 
per researcher are highest for subsidiaries of Foreign 
Groups (FOR), somewhat lower but still high in the 
case of firms belonging to Italian groups (IGP), and it is 
lowest in the case of firms not belonging to a group 
(ING). However, things are changing, as the latter firm 
category experiences the highest growth rates, while 
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FOR are decreasing their R&D efforts in Italy, and IGP 
place themselves roughly in between. 
 
The three typologies of firms exhibit different 
patterns also when looking at the strategies they use to 
access external knowledge. We look at two alternative 
channels: Extra-muros R&D, indicating the amount of 
R&D expenditure that is contracted out to third parties; 
and technical collaborations with other firms and 
institutions.  
 
As shown in Table 1, group belonging is also 
associated to remarkably higher values of R&D extra-
muros per firm, relative to the case of ING. However, 
firms belonging to Italian groups appear to be more 
involved in this external sourcing strategy than 
subsidiaries of foreign groups. Moreover, ING appear 
to have significantly increased their extra muros R&D 
over time, and play a non trivial role in contracting out 
R&D to universities.  Figure 2 confirms that firms 
belonging to groups play a greater role in extra-muros 
R&D, but have significantly reduced their efforts to use 
this channel to access external knowledge over time, 
particularly in the case of subsidiaries of foreign 
multinationals, while ING have experienced a 
remarkable increase in this respect. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Average Extra-muros R&D expenditure per firm (in thousands of Euro), by typology of firm, 
selected years 
 
Source: elaborations on ISTAT RS1 
 
 
The other strategy we consider as a measure of 
external knowledge sourcing, i.e. technical 
collaborations, can only be measured in terms of a 
dummy that identifies whether or not the observed firm 
got involved in R&D collaborations in any given year 
over the examined period.  Figure 3 illustrates the share 
of firms cooperating in general and the share of firms 
cooperating with universities in Italy. We find that FOR 
firms are the most involved in cooperation, followed by 
IGP and then by ING. However, the overall number of 
ING firms cooperating in general and with Italian 
universities in particular is increasing (the CAGR is 
9.7% and 11.2% respectively), while this increase is 
lower for IGP firms (6.8% and 6.1%) and even negative 
for the FOR category when cooperation with Italian 
universities is considered (the CAGR is 1.4% and -
1.5% respectively). This translates into a decrease of 
the share of collaborations in which FOR and IGP firms 
are involved, whereas the share remains quite stable for 
ING.  
The degree of cooperation with Foreign universities 
is always very low: the share of firms involved in such 
collaborations ranges between 1% and 8% of total 
firms. Also in this case, the ING typology is the only 
one showing an increase over the examined period. 
To conclude this overview of descriptive evidence, 
some heterogeneity exists across the examined 
categories of Italian firms, both in terms of internal 
R&D efforts and in terms of external knowledge 
sourcing strategies. On the one hand, the subsets of 
firms that exhibit the highest R&D intensity  - IGP and 
FOR – are also the ones showing the highest intensity 
of outsourcing strategies (as shown in table 1). On the 
other hand, hierarchies we have observed in the case of 
R&D intensity do not seem to perfectly mirror into 
hierarchies in terms of external knowledge sourcing. 
FOR do not always outperform all other firms, IGP 
often take the lead especially in extra-muros R&D,  
ING firms have significantly increased their overall 
R&D efforts throughout the whole period, and have 
intensified their extra-muros R&D contracting out and 
technical cooperation in general and with universities in 
particular.  
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Figure 3 - Shares of firms involved in R&D collaborations, by category of R&D spenders 
 
Source: elaborations on ISTAT RS1 
 
It thus appears that the links between internal and 
external R&D are somewhat mediated by the 
characteristics of firms under observation, and by the 
nature of third parties involved in external R&D 
sourcing strategies, with universities playing a peculiar 
role in this respect. Of course, examining the propensity 
of different categories of firms to resort to external 
knowledge sources requires that several sources of 
heterogeneity are simultaneously controlled for. This is 
what we shall do in the next section.    
 
3. The links between group belonging, absorptive 
capacity and external knowledge sourcing 
We have run regressions to test differences in the 
propensity of firms to access external knowledge in the 
Italian industry, conditional on a number of controls.  
See tables 2a and 2b for variable definition and 
descriptive statistics.  
The first set of tests has been conducted using the 
yearly value of Extra-muros R&D expenditure in 2001-
2010 as a dependent variable. This captures the amount 
of research activity contracted out by firms to external 
parties, including public and private research 
institutions and other companies. We employ OLS with 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors  to 
produce estimates with firms not belonging to a group – 
which we identified as ING in section 2 – as baseline 
category. In column (1) of table 3 we show how firms 
belonging to Italian groups (IGP) and affiliates of 
foreign owned (multinational) groups (FOR) differ 
from independent companies in terms of R&D 
contracting out activities, controlling only for usual 
measures of size, firm level capital expenditure, sector 
and time dummies. As expected, FOR and IGP firms 
exhibit a much higher propensity to resort to extra-
muros R&D relative to companies not belonging to 
groups, with a substantial premium of 30.4% and 
23.4% respectively. As highlighted in column (2) intra-
muros R&D, as a proxy of “internal absorptive 
capacity”, explains an important part of these premia. 
In fact the difference in the propensity to contracting 
out R&D shrinks by over one third in the case of FOR 
and slightly less than 30% in the case of IGP. There 
remains a remarkable differential between FOR and 
IGP relative to the baseline category. The hierarchy 
between FOR (19.7% higher propensity) and IGP 
(17.6% higher propensity) also persists, although it has 
diminished to a tiny 2%. Roughly the same premia 
relative to independent firms and the same hierarchy 
are confirmed when further controls for R&D efforts 
are introduced in column (3), to better capture “internal 
absorptive capacity”. Given that controls for firms size 
(measured in terms of total FTE employees) are present 
for all equations, coefficients estimated for intra-muros 
R&D and for R&D employees reflect how the 
propensity to R&D contracting is sensitive to two 
different measures of R&D intensity, one expressed in 
terms of expenditures and the other expressed in terms 
of personnel dedicated to R&D. Due to data limitation, 
extant literature has most frequently used variants of 
the latter measure (R&D personnel/total employees) as 
an indicator of R&D intensity. Column (3) of table 3 
shows that it is R&D expenditure, more than the 
availability of additional R&D employees, that explains 
the larger share of the propensity to contract R&D to 
external parties5. The persistence of R&D activity over 
time, proxied by the number of years firms have 
                                                
5 Running separate regressions by typology of firms, it 
comes out that R&D employees have always a positive 
and significant impact only in the case of ING firms, 
while they are always not significant for foreign 
subsidiaries. 
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reported a positive value of R&D in the annual RS1 
survey on R&D performers conducted by ISTAT  in the 
examined period (2001-2010), also helps explain 
differences in R&D contracted out, although this seems 
to play a relatively minor role. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2a - Variable definition 
Dependent variables 
LN Extra-MUROS R&D: (Natural Log of) Extra-muros R&D expenditure 
LN Extra-muros to University: (Natural Log of) Extra-muros R&D expenditure commissioned to Italian 
Universities 
Cooperation: dummy “cooperation with an external partner” 
Cooperation with Universities: dummy “cooperation with Italian University” 
 
Measures of internal R&D efforts 
Ln Intra-muros R&D:  (Natural Log of) Intra-muros R&D expenditure 
R&D Persistence: number of years with positive Intra-muros R&D (persistence) 
Ln R&D Employees: (Natural Log of) number of R&D employees FTE (full time equivalent) 
 
Controls for firm tipologies 
ING: dummy “firm not in a group” 
IGP: dummy “firm in an Italian group” 
FOR: dummy “subsidiary of a foreign group” 
IGNFR: dummy for “firm in an Italian group without research performed abroad” 
IGFR: dummy for “firm in an Italian group with research performed abroad” 
 
Other controls 
Size: (Natural Log of) number of firm employees FTE (Size control) 
Sector: Hi-tech, Medium-hi-tech, Medium-low-tech, Low-tech, KIS, L(ess)KIS, Other 
Capital expenditures: dummy for “R&D expenditure for Machinery, Equipment and Software” 
Time dummies 
 
 
Table 2b – descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics 
 N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
ING 39,152 0 1 0.612 0.487 
IGP 39,152 0 1 0.302 0.459 
FOR 39,152 0 1 0.086 0.281 
IGNFR 39,152 0 1 0.287 0.452 
IGFR 39,152 0 1 0.014 0.119 
Employees FTE 39,152 0.750 62,456 289.468 1,701.357 
Capital expenditure 39,152 0 1 .418 0.493 
Intra-muros R&D 39,152 1 779,778 2,158.260 14,756.887 
R&D Persistence 39,152 1 10 4.674 2.827 
R&D employees 39,152 0 8,012 21.561 115.211 
Extra-muros R&D 39,152 0 656,019 432.150 8,004.167 
Extra-muros to University 39,152 0 64,241 16.670 487.642 
Cooperation 39,152 0 1 0.345 0.475 
Cooperation with 
University 39,152 0 1 0.155 0.362 
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Table 3 – The propensity to contracting our extra-muros R&D. OLS regressions with robust standard errors / 
dependent variable : LN Extra-muros 
 1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Ln Extra-muros R&D 
Ln Extra-muros 
R&D 
Ln Extra-muros 
R&D 
Ln Extra-muros 
R&D 
     
IGP 0.234*** 0.168*** 0.176***  
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)  
IGNFR    0.118*** 
    (0.026) 
IGFR    2.044*** 
    (0.148) 
FOR 0.304*** 0.197*** 0.208*** 0.261*** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Ln Intra-muros R&D  0.331*** 0.228*** 0.216*** 
  (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) 
R&D Persistence   0.030*** 0.026*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln R&D Employees   0.123*** 0.116*** 
   (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant -0.470*** -1.326*** -1.010*** -0.851*** 
 (0.066) (0.076) (0.088) (0.087) 
     
Number of observations 39,152 39,152 39,152 39,152 
     
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.129 0.131 0.141 
Size, sector, capital expenditure controls and time dummies included 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
It thus appears that introducing additional proxies of 
internal R&D efforts does capture some aspects of 
heterogeneity, helps identify R&D expenditures as the 
key aspect of internal absorptive capacity (relative to 
other indicators of R&D efforts), and improves the fit 
of estimates (as confirmed by the R-squared values in 
the tables).  
Nevertheless, group belonging remains a 
fundamental structural characteristic that explains 
differences in the propensity to R&D contracting to 
external parties by a factor of 18-20%. We interpret this 
result as consistent with our reading of group belonging 
as associated to additional technological and 
organizational assets that increase the ability of firms to 
explore, evaluate and access external knowledge. As 
argued in the introduction, firms organized into groups 
appear to exhibit an additional absorptive capacity, due 
to their possibility of drawing from different 
repositories of knowledge within the group itself. This 
is what we have identified as “intra-group” absorptive 
capacity that can be used to improve firms’ own ability 
to evaluate and assimilate external technology, know 
how and practices. Moreover, our results can be seen as 
confirming the advantages of group belonging also in 
terms of more extensive application and exploitation of 
knowledge relative to independent firms, hence 
increasing the expected advantages from access to 
external sources. 
What about the extra-advantage of multinationality? 
We have suggested in the introductory section that  
 
multinational groups should be expected to have an 
extra endowment of absorptive capacity and greater 
applications opportunities stemming from their more 
extensive internal networks of affiliates and external 
networks of collaborations, spanning across different 
countries, markets and innovation systems. From this 
perspective, one might have expected the premium 
associated to FOR to be higher than observed in table 3, 
as these are by definition firms belonging to (foreign 
owned) multinational groups active in Italy. These 
firms do exhibit a slightly greater premium than IGPs 
in terms of extra-muros R&D relative to independent 
firms. What should be noted, however, is that firms 
belonging to Italian groups (IGP) include inter alia 
those companies that are part of nationally controlled 
groups with foreign activities, i.e. Italian 
multinationals. Unfortunately the available data do not 
allow to fully separate Italian uninational from Italian 
multinational groups. It is rather possible to identify a 
subset of multinationals that is constituted by those 
Italian firms that have R&D activities abroad. These are 
also by definition part of multinational groups, and 
represent a particularly dynamic fraction of the Italian 
economy, a restricted minority of firms that are able to 
overcome the costs and risks of setting up a foreign 
research lab. As illustrated in more details in other 
works (cf. Cozza and Zanfei 2014), there are only a few 
dozens of such firms (124 such firms are monitored in 
the ISTAT-RS1 dataset, with over two thirds of 
outward R&D in the hands of the top ten R&D 
investors). However, they account for over a quarter of 
total Gross National R&D expenditure and they carry 
9 
 
out more than three quarters of their foreign R&D 
activities in a few destination countries (Brazil, 
Germany, France and the US). In other words these 
firms represent the very top of the iceberg in the Italian 
innovation system and are most likely to outperform 
other companies active in Italy also in terms of their 
ability to access external knowledge. We test this 
hypothesis in column 4 of table 3, where IGP are 
separated into two subsets, that is firms that do belong 
to an Italian group but do not have foreign R&D 
activities (IGNFR); and those that not only belong to an 
Italian group but also carry out foreign research activity 
(IGFR). As shown in column 4, the latter category of 
firms has a much higher propensity to R&D contracting 
relative to the baseline category of independent firms, a 
premium that is also much higher than in the case of 
FOR firms themselves. On the one hand this result 
confirms that IGFR are really the top of the iceberg as 
suggested, and they are particularly in the position to 
evaluate, access and absorb external knowledge. On the 
other hand, foreign companies appear to be relatively 
less prone to extra-muros R&D, possibly revealing a 
weaker profile of foreign R&D investors  active in 
Italy. This view is roughly consistent with previous 
evidence on the low and decreasing involvement of 
foreign firms in R&D and other value added activities 
in Italy (Cozza and Zanfei 2014, Dachs et al 2014). 
Overall, by comparing coefficients estimated in table 
3 column 4 we find that the extra-advantages associated 
to multinationality are indeed very important, and 
explain a substantial part of heterogeneity in terms of 
extra-muros R&D activity. In fact, firms belonging to 
multinational groups not only largely outperform 
independent firms in terms of extra-muros R&D, but 
they also exhibit premia that are more than twice as 
high as the ones characterizing IGNFR in the case of 
foreign R&D investors in Italy (FOR), and 17 times as 
high in the case of Italian firms with foreign R&D 
activities (IGFR). 
We also examined extra-muros R&D contracted out 
to a specific institution, namely Italian universities6. As 
illustrated in the descriptive section of this paper, this is 
a relatively minor albeit significantly increasing 
fraction of total extra-muros R&D in Italy. In table 4, 
where the dependent variable is Extra-muros R&D to 
universities, differences across our firm categories are 
much lower. In the baseline model in column (1), 
premia range from 5.4% in the case of FOR to 2.7% in 
the case of IGP; while differences disappear once R&D 
efforts are appropriately controlled for in columns (2) 
and (3). The only firm category which exhibits a more 
substantial premium in terms of extra-muros R&D to 
universities, is the (very circumscribed) subset of 
Italian firms with foreign R&D activities (IGFR), as 
shown in column 4 of table 4. The latter result might be 
interpreted as a confirming the very specific role played 
by the few Italian firms with R&D activities abroad, 
which are inter alia likely to be able to access and 
                                                
6 The RS1 survey also asks whether the firm has R&D 
contracted out to foreign public institutions, including 
universities abroad. However, figures on this option are 
close to zero for all years in the considered period. 
utilize research at the scientific and technological 
frontier produced by universities. What is most striking, 
however, is that there seem to exist no significant 
differences between independent firms and firms 
belonging to groups in the case of extra-muros R&D to 
universities, with the relevant but very peculiar case of 
IGFR. In other words, independent firms have a much 
the same likelihood to contract R&D out to universities, 
as FOR and non internationalized firms belonging to 
Italian groups (IGNFR). This is in line with the 
descriptive evidence which we have shown, that 
independent firms are indeed very active in extra-muros 
R&D to universities and have increased their share of 
extra-muros R&D contracted out to these institutions 
over the decade under observation. The result we 
obtained is also roughly consistent with previous 
research that has emphasized that while small and 
medium sized firms – which are the bulk of 
independent firms monitored by ISTAT-RS1 – 
encounter greater obstacles to access external 
knowledge due to their limited absorptive capacity 
(Belderbos et al. 2004), they are also particularly 
interested in gaining access to technological spillovers 
especially when appropriability concerns are less 
important (Audretsch and Vivarelli 1996, Cassiman and 
Veugelers 2002, Chun and Mun 2010). This 
combination of low absorptive capacity, higher need for 
external knowledge, and lower capacity to appropriate 
results of research, might help explain why independent 
firms are relatively more prone to interact with, and 
contract research out to, universities, rather than other 
more market oriented institutions. 
We also focused on technological cooperation with 
third parties, including once again public and private 
research institutions and other companies (rivals, 
customers and suppliers). In this case the dependent 
variable is a dummy that takes value one in case the 
observed firm participates in a technical linkage with 
third parties (zero otherwise). Logit estimates with 
robust standard errors referring to cooperation are 
shown in table 5. Results are quite similar to the ones 
we obtained when we examined extra-muros R&D, and 
appear even neater in terms of premia and hierarchies. 
Here too, FOR and IGP exhibit higher propensity to 
cooperate than independent firms, even when 
controlling for different measures of internal R&D 
efforts; FOR is characterized by a higher premium than 
IGP in general, a difference that is more substantial 
than the one observed in the case of extra-muros R&D; 
IGFR are starring in this case too, and appear to be the 
best performers also in terms of technological 
cooperation. As shown in column 4 of table 5, the 
premium observed in the case of IGFR is almost twice 
as high as the one characterizing FOR, and more than 3 
times as high as the one characterizing IGNFR. These 
results are very much consistent with the view we have 
suggested: firms belonging to a group, and to an 
international group in particular, are likely to have extra 
advantages in terms of their ability to explore, evaluate, 
assimilate and utilize external knowledge.
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Table 4. – The propensity to contracting out extra-muros R&D to universities. OLS regressions with robust 
standard errors / dependent variable: LN Extra-muros to University 
 1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES 
Ln Extra-muros 
R&D to 
University 
Ln Extra-muros 
R&D to 
University 
Ln Extra-muros 
R&D to 
University 
Ln Extra-muros 
R&D to 
University 
     
IGP 0.027** 0.003 0.006  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
IGNFR    -0.005 
    (0.013) 
IGFR    0.388*** 
    (0.088) 
FOR 0.054** 0.016 0.020 0.031 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Ln Intra-muros R&D  0.117*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
R&D Persistence   0.011*** 0.011*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln R&D Employees   0.047*** 0.045*** 
   (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant -0.440*** -0.743*** -0.622*** -0.590*** 
 (0.032) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) 
     
Number of observations 39,152 39,152 39,152 39,152 
     
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.072 0.074 0.074 
Size, sector, capital expenditure controls and time dummies included 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5 – The propensity to R&D collaboration. LOGIT regressions with robust standard errors / dependent 
variable : Cooperation 
 1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation 
     
IGP 0.378*** 0.329*** 0.333***  
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)  
IGNFR    0.309*** 
    (0.028) 
IGFR    1.100*** 
    (0.097) 
FOR 0.614*** 0.544*** 0.547*** 0.565*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Ln Intra-muros R&D  0.246*** 0.200*** 0.196*** 
  (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) 
R&D Persistence   0.034*** 0.033*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln R&D Employees   0.045** 0.043** 
   (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant -2.008*** -2. 660*** -2.553*** -2.491*** 
 (0.064) (0.071) (0.092) (0.092) 
     
Number of observations 39,152 39,152 39,152 39,152 
     
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.080 0.081 0.082 
Size, sector, capital expenditure controls and time dummies included 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6 – The propensity to R&D cooperation with universities. LOGIT regressions with robust standard 
errors / dependent variable: Cooperation with University 
 1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Cooperation with University 
Cooperation 
with University 
Cooperation 
with University 
Cooperation 
with University 
     
IGP 0.315*** 0.242*** 0.254***  
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)  
IGNFR    0.238*** 
    (0.036) 
IGFR    0.615*** 
    (0.102) 
FOR 0.259*** 0.126** 0.145*** 0.160*** 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Ln Intra-muros R&D  0.347*** 0.200*** 0.197*** 
  (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) 
R&D Persistence   0.060*** 0.059*** 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln R&D Employees   0.161*** 0.159*** 
   (0.028) (0.028) 
Constant -3.916*** -4.805*** -4.381*** -4.335*** 
 (0.088) (0.099) (0.126) (0.126) 
     
Number of observations 39,152 39,152 39,152 39,152 
     
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.118 0.122 0.123 
Size, sector, capital expenditure controls and time dummies included 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As in the case of extra-muros R&D, we checked for 
differences in the case of collaborative linkages with 
Italian universities7. Table 6 illustrates results when 
using a dummy for technical cooperation with 
universities as dependent variable. There are some 
important similarities and diversities in this case. What 
is similar to the scenario we have drawn earlier, is that 
premia associated to group belonging are smaller for 
cooperation with universities than in the case of 
cooperation in general. This might confirm that 
interacting with universities is a relatively more 
attractive business for independent firms (and hence 
SMEs) due to the higher expectations of (incoming) 
spillovers and lower appropriability issues raised when 
dealing with non for-profit institutions. Different from 
what we obtained in the case of extra-muros R&D to 
universities, however, premia do not disappear in this 
case: advantages associated to group belonging do 
persist, and continue to explain an important portion of 
heterogeneity in technical cooperation with universities. 
A possible explanation is that cooperation is more 
demanding in terms of organizational and technical 
skills, more generally speaking it requires that greater 
resources and commitment are devoted than in the case 
of R&D contracting out. The different availability of 
such organizational and technical resources within 
groups do seem to matter a lot in the case of technical 
cooperation with university as well. And this militates 
against technical cooperation for independent firms 
relative to firms belonging to a group.  
 
A further similarity with respect to previous results 
is that controlling for internal R&D efforts does 
improve significantly our understanding of technical 
cooperation, and the most relevant factor in this respect 
is intra-muros R&D. However, the latter plays a 
stronger role here than in the case extra-muros R&D to 
universities. Once again, this can be used to support the 
idea that technical cooperation with universities 
requires important research capabilities, something that 
independent firms most often do not have. 
A final aspect that is similar to what we observed 
earlier is the role of Italian firms that do belong to a 
group but also carry out R&D activities abroad (IGFR), 
that are outperforming all other firm categories in this 
case too. What is different from previous results is that 
the premium for FOR firms is lower than in the case of 
firms belonging to Italian groups,  even those that do 
not have any R&D activities abroad (IGNFR), as 
shown in table 6 column 4. It thus appears that being 
part of a group in general is an asset for technical 
cooperation with universities, and this is particularly 
the case for Italian firms that do not only belong to a 
group but also carry out R&D activities abroad (IGFR); 
but this is much less the case of firms belonging to 
foreign owned (multinational) groups. The available 
                                                
7 Also for the cooperation variable, the choice 
“cooperation with foreign universities” does exist but it 
is almost always equal to 0. 
data do not allow to go much further to explain the 
latter result. Suffice here to submit a few, not 
necessarily alternative interpretive elements that would 
need be checked for. On the one hand, the relatively 
low premium associated to FOR might have to do with 
the fact that, as already noted, the profile of foreign 
R&D performers is relatively low and has been 
worsening over the past decade. On the other hand, one 
might suggest that foreign companies that would be 
capable to, and willing to, gain access to academic 
research, might have to deal with country specific 
institutional barriers. To the extent that these barriers 
are higher than the ones they would encounter when 
interacting with other research institutions at home or in 
other countries where multinationals are located, FOR 
firms might be discouraged to cooperate with Italian 
universities. In either case, this result is revealing of a 
difficulty of the Italian innovation system in using this 
channel to gain access to international technology 
flows. 
 
To complete the analysis, we have also addressed the 
possible biases that might be determined by one of the 
measures we used to capture internal R&D efforts, 
namely the ones based on R&D employees. As 
anticipated in section 2, there might be non trivial 
problems with these measures particularly in the case of 
SMEs, that constitute the bulk of the ING category. 
Small firms are most likely to resort to part time 
personnel, and to multi-task workers, which might well 
carry out different activities, including R&D, according 
to the needs and circumstances. This is likely to 
increase the risk that the actual workforce devoted to 
R&D is not well measured, particularly in the case of 
SMEs. The adoption of FTE data – which we use in all 
our regressions – does correct for this inconvenience, as 
part-time employees are more accurately accounted for, 
but does not fully solve the problem of multi-task 
workers. In fact, labor force statistics end up accounting 
for FTE workers in terms of their main function rather 
than in terms of their contributions to different 
activities they perform within the firm. To test for 
possible biases that might affect our estimates we 
conducted two different sets of robustness checks. First, 
we ran regressions substituting specifications reported 
in columns 3 and 4 of all tables discussed above 
controlling for two measures of R&D efforts instead of 
three, that is intra-muros R&D expenditure and R&D 
persistence, thus excluding R&D FTE employees. 
Second, we estimated the same equations on a sub-
sample of firms not including firms with 10 employees 
or less, that is the firm category most likely to resort to 
part-time workers and, even more importantly, to multi-
task employees. Both sets of robustness checks yield 
results that do not substantially differ from the ones 
illustrated above, in terms of both significance and 
signs of estimated coefficients. Premia estimated for 
IGP and FOR, and for IGFR in particular, relative to 
the baseline category of ING firms, remain substantial 
wherever the hierarchy turned out clear in the models 
we have already illustrated, although the size of 
coefficients turns out lower in the case of the second set 
of robustness checks. This is not surprising as the latter 
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set of regressions is based on a sub-sample that 
excludes micro-firms, which normally lack absorptive 
capacity and hence can be expected to have the lowest 
propensity to set up external linkages. In fact they 
combine the disadvantages of small size with the lower 
ability to join (national and international) groups. Thus, 
our tests seem to suggest that results shown in tables 3 
through 6 are rather robust, although one cannot 
exclude that they are biased upward, reflecting the fact 
that micro-firms might indeed be particularly 
characterized by the employment of multi-task workers, 
and this could in fact determine that their actual R&D 
efforts are underestimated8.      
 
4. Conclusion 
We have shown that the links between internal and 
external R&D efforts are mediated by some structural 
characteristics of firms that help explain an important 
portion of knowledge sourcing strategies. With 
reference to the Italian case, we have particularly 
focused on group belonging as a factor that might 
augment firms’ ability to explore, evaluate, assimilate 
and utilize external knowledge.  From this perspective, 
firms that are part of multinational groups appear to be 
more prone to gain access to external knowledge than 
those belonging to uni-national groups, let alone 
independent firms which exhibit the lowest propensity 
to technology sourcing. The relative dis-advantage of 
independent firms, which represent the bulk of the 
Italian industry and include most small and medium 
sized enterprises, appears to be less of an obstacle in 
the case of linkages with universities, especially when 
R&D contracting out is considered. The increasing 
involvement of independent firms in this strategy of 
external knowledge access is playing an important role 
in the catching up process that these firms are 
undertaking to maintain and increase their 
competitiveness.  It remains that this category of firms 
continues to appear in a rather weak position in the 
development of other technology sourcing strategies 
that would complement their scarce internal 
competencies.  
The other side of the coin is represented by the 
diminishing involvement of foreign owned firms in 
R&D activities in Italy. This is bad news for Italy, as 
affiliates of multinationals normally exhibit a high 
R&D intensity and are able to exploit the advantages 
and opportunities associated to extensive internal 
networks of affiliates and external linkages across 
national borders, thus increasing their ability and 
propensity to exchange knowledge with external 
parties.  In this scenario, the most dynamic part of the 
Italian innovation system is constituted  by a very 
limited number of nationally owned firms that not only 
belong to a group but are also able to set up R&D 
activities abroad. These appear to clearly outperform all 
other firm categories also in terms of extra-muros R&D 
                                                
8 Results of these robustness check regressions are 
available from the authors upon request.  
and technological cooperation with third parties, 
including universities.  However it is only the top of the 
iceberg, representative of a rather restricted 
oligopolistic core of the Italian industry. The overall 
ability of the Italian economy to access international 
channels of technology generation, absorption and 
diffusion thus remains rather weak, and this might have 
negative consequences on the long run perspectives of 
economic growth for this country. 
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